Patricia Faraldo-Cabana (2017) Money and the Governance of Punishment: A Genealogy of the Penal Fine. Routledge. by Hogg, Russell
www.crimejusticejournal.com	IJCJ&SD	2018	7(3):	128‐131	 	ISSN	2202‐8005	
		
©	The	Author(s)	2018	
Book	Review	
Patricia	Faraldo‐Cabana	(2017)	Money	and	the	Governance	of	
Punishment:	A	Genealogy	of	the	Penal	Fine.	Routledge.		
Russell	Hogg	
Queensland	University	of	Technology,	Australia	
	
	
	
This	 book	makes	 a	welcome	 contribution	 to	 a	 growing	 critical	 literature	 on	 the	 fine.	 In	most	
jurisdictions	across	the	liberal	democratic	capitalist	world,	a	 fine	 is	the	most	common	penalty	
imposed	 by	 courts,	 although	 you	would	 hardly	 appreciate	 this	 fact	 if	 you	 only	 consulted	 the	
academic	literature	on	punishment,	especially	the	English‐language	literature.	A	flourishing	body	
of	punishment	and	society	scholarship	since	the	1970s	has	all	but	 ignored	financial	sanctions,	
preoccupied	as	it	has	been	with	the	prison,	the	penal	sanction	least	commonly	imposed	by	the	
courts,	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	with	 other	 community	 sanctions	 like	 probation.	 Interest	 in	 the	
prison	is	understandable	given	it	is	the	most	consequential	of	punishments	(at	least	in	all	those	
jurisdictions	 that	 have	 abolished	 capital	 punishment)	 and	 is	 a	 penalty	 of	 singular	 symbolic	
significance.	But,	as	Faraldo‐Cabana	argues,	this	hardly	justifies	neglect	of	the	fine,	given	the	sheer	
scale	of	its	use	and	the	fact	that	the	history	of	the	fine	is	intertwined	with	that	of	imprisonment.	
Yet	academic	analysis	of	the	latter	has	been	typically	undertaken	‘as	if	fines	did	not	exist.’	Her	
study	is	centrally	concerned	to	redress	this.	It	is	of	particular	value	in	that	it	introduces	English‐
speaking	readers	to	the	vast	body	of	research	on	European	law	and	legal	history	relating	to	penal	
fines	and	a	treasure	trove	of	sources	not	otherwise	available	in	English.		
	
For	 the	 Enlightenment	 juridical	 reformers	 whose	 goal	 was	 a	 strict	 legal	 code	 of	 crimes	 and	
punishments	 in	 which	 an	 abstract	 (quantifiable,	 divisible)	 medium	 permitted	 the	 quanta	 of	
punishment	to	be	matched	to	the	gravity	of	crimes,	the	fine	held	an	obvious	attraction;	more	so	
than	the	prison	which,	as	Faraldo‐Cabana	points	out,	was	not	as	popular	with	classical	 liberal	
thinkers	 as	 is	 often	 supposed.	 The	 fine	 was	 also	 attractive	 (at	 least	 in	 principle)	 because	 it	
sanctioned	while	not	intruding	upon	personal	liberty	and	allowed	a	system	of	punishment	to	be	
directly	assimilated	to	a	market	economy:	offenders	would	pay	for	their	wrongs	(their	bads)	just	
as	they	did	for	their	goods	and	without	interfering	with	their	‘freedom’	to	participate	in	the	labour	
market	or	imposing	on	the	state	the	cost	of	‘caring’	for	the	families	of	offenders.		
	
As	Faraldo‐Cabana	points	out,	latter	day	neo‐liberal	law	and	economics	theorists	like	Gary	Becker	
and	Richard	Posner	quite	literally	treat	the	criminal	law	as	a	pricing	mechanism	in	precisely	this	
sense.	Accepting	the	possibility	of	equivalence	between	amounts	of	money	and	amounts	of	time,	
they	saw	the	potential	for	the	fine	to	further	dominate	the	domain	of	punishment.	Their	classical	
predecessors,	although	supporters	of	the	fine,	saw	that	there	were	definite	limits	to	its	application	
in	the	field	of	punishment.	Beccaria	thought	a	fine	to	be,	in	principle,	the	most	fitting	penalty	for	
Book	Review	
IJCJ&SD									129	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2018	7(3)	
theft	but,	as	theft	was	generally	a	crime	of	poverty,	offenders	would	lack	the	capacity	to	pay.	The	
transferability	of	fines	also	meant	that	the	innocent	would	suffer	along	with	(or	instead	of)	the	
offender.	Bentham,	author	of	the	panopticon,	shared	the	view	of	other	utilitarian	and	evangelical	
reformers	 that	punishment	must	have	a	disciplinary	 function,	as	well	as	a	strictly	 legal	one,	 if	
members	of	the	labouring	and	poorer	classes	were	to	be	made	subject	to	the	requirements	of	an	
industrial	 market	 society.	 This	 necessarily	 limited	 the	 role	 that	 could	 be	 played	 by	 a	 non‐
disciplinary	penalty	like	the	fine	but,	notwithstanding	this,	Bentham	came	to	look	upon	it	as	the	
ideal	sanction.		
	
From	being	a	widely	used	sanction	in	the	eighteenth	century,	the	fine	gave	way	in	the	nineteenth	
century	to	a	greater	reliance	on	imprisonment	for	the	punishment	of	common	crimes.	One	reason	
for	this	was	that	imprisonment	was	looked	upon	as	the	more	equal	punishment,	freedom	being	
something	 that	 was	 more	 readily	 assumed,	 in	 Enlightenment	 thought,	 to	 be	 possessed	 by	
everyone	in	the	same	degree:	‘imprisonment	could	be	applied	with	more	equal	force	than	fines	to	
those	with	means	 and	 those	without’.	 The	 upper	 classes	 should	 not	 be	 allowed	 to	 ‘buy	 their	
freedom’,	as	they	had	done	in	previous	times.	The	fine	and	imprisonment,	therefore,	were	never	
treated	as	simply	interchangeable.		
	
This	 pattern	was	 reversed	 to	 a	 degree	 from	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century	 and	 Faraldo‐Cabana	
traces	the	expansion	of	the	fine	that	took	place	in	most	of	the	countries	of	Western	and	Northern	
Europe	thereafter,	including	providing	a	detailed	account	of	the	adoption	of	day	fine	systems.	She	
shows	how	the	failings	of	the	prison,	widely	condemned	prison	conditions	and	obstacles	to	prison	
reform	 eventually	 led	 to	 support	 for	 substituting	 fines	 for	 short	 prison	 terms	 where	 minor	
offences	were	concerned.	At	the	same	time,	the	fine	offered	a	resolution	to	the	problem	posed	by	
the	‘respectable	offender’.	In	the	nineteenth	century,	fines	came	to	be	widely	used	to	sanction	the	
crimes	 and	 regulatory	offences	of	 business,	 corporations	 and	 the	well‐to‐do,	 those	who	 could	
afford	to	pay	their	way	and	for	whom	corrective	discipline	was	not	regarded	as	necessary.		
	
However,	there	were	obvious	limits	to,	and	contradictions	arising	from,	efforts	to	expand	reliance	
on	the	fine	as	a	substitute	for	imprisonment.	These	issues	are	analysed	in	scrupulous	detail	by	
Faraldo‐Cabana.		
	
Money’s	great	attraction	as	a	sanction	is	that	it	is	precisely	calculable	and	endlessly	divisible.	The	
self‐same	characteristics,	however,	mean	that	money	as	punishment	compromises	the	‘principle	
of	 personality’	 of	 punishment,	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 burden	 of	 punishment	must	 be	 borne	 by	 the	
offender.	How	is	it	ever	possible	to	know	with	certainty	whose	money	is	paying	a	fine?	In	many	
parts	of	Europe	and	elsewhere	(for	example,	in	Israel)	concerted	efforts	were	made	from	the	late	
nineteenth	century	to	enforce	the	personality	principle	in	respect	of	fines	and	prevent	third	party	
payment.	In	practice,	this	is,	of	course,	difficult—if	not	impossible—to	effectively	enforce.	This	
reduces	the	efficacy	of	the	penal	fine	as	an	alternative	to	incarceration.		
	
As	noted,	the	other	great	attraction	of	the	fine	from	a	liberal	philosophical	standpoint	is	that	it	
does	 not	 infringe	 the	 bodily	 integrity	 or	 personal	 liberty	 of	 the	 individual.	 It	 penalises	while	
preserving	personal	freedom.	The	fine	burdens	only	the	wealth	of	the	individual.	Yet,	in	liberal	
capitalist	market	societies	characterised	by	steep	inequalities	of	wealth	and	income,	this	means	
that	the	fine	is	necessarily	the	most	unequal	and	least	fair	of	punishments.	On	the	one	hand,	it	is	
unequal	 in	 both	 the	 sense	 that	 small	 money	 amounts	 may	 impose	 undue	 burdens	 on	 poor	
offenders,	 while	 even	 very	 substantial	 amounts	 imposed	 on	 wealthy	 offenders	 constitute	 no	
punishment	at	all.	And,	if	fines	imposed	on	those	who	were	unable	to	pay	simply	converted	into	
a	short	 term	of	 imprisonment	anyway	due	 to	default,	 reliance	on	 the	 fine	as	an	alternative	 to	
prison	would	be	self‐defeating.	On	the	other	hand,	if	fines	were	to	serve	as	such	an	alternative,	
they	could	not	be	reduced	to	token	levels	and	payment	must	be	effectively	enforced.		
	
Book	Review	
IJCJ&SD									130	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2018	7(3)	
There	is	a	fundamental	tension,	therefore,	between	two	forms	or	principles	of	equality:	equality	
(or	proportionality)	relating	to	the	offence	and	equality	relating	to	the	impact	on	the	offender.	
The	problem	remained	and	was	widely	recognised	across	numerous	European	countries:	how	is	
it	possible	to	make	extended	use	of	the	fine	in	a	population	where	many	people	live	in	poverty?	
Was	the	fine	to	be	simply	a	‘privilege	of	the	rich’,	an	overt	form	of	class	justice?	How	to	devise	a	
system	 of	 fines	 that	 reflects—does	 justice	 to—both	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 offence	 and	 the	
circumstances	 of	 the	 offender?	 And,	 how	 to	 differentiate	 cases	 of	 inability	 to	 pay	 from	
unwillingness	to	pay?		
	
Faraldo‐Cabana	examines	at	length	the	various	efforts	to	address	the	problem	of	fine	default	in	
Europe	 from	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century	 on,	 including	 unsuccessful	 attempts	 to	 restrict	
imprisonment	for	default	to	those	defaulters	who	wilfully	refused	to	pay;	the	imposition	of	limits	
on	prison	 terms	 for	default;	 requirements	 to	 take	account	of	 the	 financial	means	of	offenders	
when	 setting	 fines;	 the	 making	 of	 provision	 for	 time	 to	 pay	 and	 payment	 in	 instalments;	
experiments	with	substituting	community	service	for	fine	defaulters;	and	the	introduction	of	day	
fine	systems	(initially	in	several	Nordic	countries	in	the	1920s	and	much	later	elsewhere	in	parts	
of	Europe).	Some	of	these	efforts	did	lead	to	dramatic	declines	in	imprisonment	for	fine	default.	
Others	had	mixed	results.		
	
Day	fine	systems	are	the	most	sophisticated	response	to	the	issue	of	equity	and	the	problems	of	
default,	but	implementation	is	not	without	major	challenges.	Accessing	reliable	information	as	to	
the	financial	means	of	offenders	can	be	practically	difficult,	prolonging	hearings	and	undermining	
the	speed	and	ease	of	administration	of	large	caseloads	by	summary	courts.	A	more	fundamental	
problem	 stems	 from	 the	 need	 to	 reconcile	 the	 competing	 equality	 principles.	 Although	 it	 is	
obvious	that	the	(penal)	impact	of	money	penalties	depends	on	the	means	of	the	offender,	courts	
are	mindful	that	a	penalty	must	retain	some	connection	to	the	gravity	of	the	offence	if	it	is	to	be	
consistent	with	recognised	sentencing	aims;	regardless	of	the	means	of	the	offender,	 it	can	be	
neither	derisory	nor	manifestly	excessive,	having	regard	 to	 the	offence.	The	ultimate	problem	
might	not	be	(or	not	only	be)	that	the	poor	lack	the	means	to	pay	fines	but	that,	for	the	wealthy,	
even	large	fines	have	no	punitive	effect.	England’s	short‐lived	experiment	with	a	unit	fine	system	
in	the	1990s	was	quickly	abandoned	under	media	pressure	that	stemmed	in	large	part	from	this	
tension.		
	
The	tension	exerts	a	downward	pressure	on	the	range	of	fines	imposed	for	offences	of	a	similar	
nature	committed	by	offenders	of	widely	divergent	means.	In	other	words,	a	serious	hardship	is	
still	imposed	on	indigent	and	poor	offenders	while	the	impact	on	the	wealthy	offender	for	a	like	
offence	 of	 any	 fine	 that	 can	 be	 said	 to	 satisfy	 other	 sentencing	 principles	 will	 amount	 to	 no	
punishment	at	all.	So	‘equal	impact’	becomes	a	chimera	and,	therefore,	the	hardship	imposed	on	
the	poor	cannot	but	be	experienced	as	unjust.	So,	although	the	fine	is	often	championed	as	the	
‘ideal	penalty’—one	that	can	be	 finely	calibrated	to	reflect	sentencing	principles—this	may	be	
quite	illusory	if	fines	have	to	be	set	at	levels	that	tend	not	to	punish	the	wealthy	at	all.	Only	the	
Nordic	 countries	with	 their	deeply	 ingrained	egalitarian	cultures	appear	able	 to	 reconcile	 the	
tensions	with	their	day	fine	systems.		
	
The	tension	between	the	equality	principles	defines	the	central	predicament	facing	modern	penal	
policy	relating	to	the	fine.	There	is	the	further	issue	of	whether,	given	the	denunciatory	function	
of	criminal	law	with	respect	to	those	wrongs	that	offend	against	fundamental	values,	this	can	be	
achieved	in	the	language	of	money.		
	
The	 often‐cited	 attractions	 of	 the	 fine—simplicity,	 speed,	 efficiency,	 ease	 of	 application,	
reversibility,	and	so	on—begin	to	fall	away	as	soon	as	such	problems	and	contradictions	are	taken	
seriously.	The	tendency	in	many	jurisdictions,	both	in	the	common	law	world	and	in	Europe,	has	
been	to	fudge	them,	largely	to	the	unfair	detriment	of	the	poor.	Critical	scholarship	on	the	fine	
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such	as	that	of	Patricia	Faraldo‐Cabana	should	contribute	to	a	climate	which	will	make	that	more	
difficult.		
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